India needs a comprehensive doctrine on space security
Source: The Hindu, 18 November 2026
Summary
- The author argues that India needs a comprehensive space-security doctrine. Satellites now underpin the economy, governance and the armed forces.
- The threat is shifting from physical destruction of satellites to disruption of the services they provide. Jamming, spoofing, cyber interference and electronic warfare are the main means.
- India has existing building blocks (the Indian Space Policy 2023 and ISRO's ISSAR-2025). It still lacks clear thresholds, attribution standards and response principles.
- The author wants a doctrine built on resilience, space-domain awareness, and reconstitution and recovery. It should involve government, the armed forces, ISRO and commercial operators, and it should not be a push towards weaponisation.
Key facts for Prelims
- Indian Space Policy 2023: the roles are split among ISRO (R&D), NSIL (commercial arm) and IN-SPACe (single-window authorisation and promotion). It is a policy, not a statute.
- IN-SPACe is under the Department of Space. NSIL is a wholly owned Government of India company.
- ISSAR is ISRO's annual Space Situational Awareness report, compiled by IS4OM. ISSAR-2025 was released in April 2026.
- Defence Space Agency (DSA) is supported by the DSRO.
- Mission Shakti (2019) was an ASAT test in LEO. India is the fourth country with this capability.
- NETRA (Network for Space Objects Tracking and Analysis) is ISRO's indigenous space-object tracking project.
- Concepts in the news: jamming, spoofing, space-domain awareness, reconstitution, space situational awareness, attribution.
Data and details
- Space-enabled services named by the article as critical: communications, navigation, weather forecasting, disaster management, agriculture, banking, logistics and critical infrastructure.
- The armed forces use space for communications, positioning, surveillance, timing and situational awareness.
- Threat types the article lists: jamming and spoofing (communications and navigation), cyber interference (satellite networks and ground stations), and electronic warfare (signal degradation). These produce effects without physically damaging a spacecraft, which complicates attribution and response.
- The vulnerability lies in the wider architecture connecting space assets to ground users, not only in the satellite.
- The article's unresolved questions:
- What counts as an attack?
- Is destruction different from jamming, spoofing or cyber interference?
- How should attribution work when multiple actors and complex networks are involved?
- What if the disruption is temporary but has major effects?
- How can accidental interference be told from deliberate attack?
- How should a response be set under uncertain attribution without escalating a crisis?
- Existing frameworks named by the article: Indian Space Policy 2023 (overarching framework) and ISSAR-2025 (space situational awareness, collision avoidance and debris mitigation).
- Three doctrine pillars:
- resilience (multiple systems, redundancy, flexibility);
- space-domain awareness (anomaly detection and attribution);
- reconstitution and recovery (rapid restoration).
- Doctrine aim: to deter, withstand, attribute and recover from disruption while preserving the peaceful use of space.
- Measure of space security: the capacity to preserve functions, withstand shocks and recover quickly, not the accumulation of capabilities.
- Author: Advitya Madan, analyst of geopolitics and defence. He commanded 15 Punjab in Lebanon under the UN flag, commanded 27 Sector as DIG in Churachandpur, and served as Brigadier, Operational Logistics, at HQ Western Command.
Static–dynamic linkage
Space is a "global commons" under the Outer Space Treaty regime (1967). That regime stresses peaceful use and bans placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit. India is a party and, in international fora, advocates peaceful use. Modern space security is "dual-use": the same satellites serve civilians and the military.
Space assets are exposed along three segments:
- the space segment (the satellite);
- the link segment (radio-frequency links, vulnerable to jamming and spoofing);
- the ground segment (ground stations, vulnerable to cyber-attack).
Because the link and ground segments can be attacked without any physical damage, attribution is hard and the legal threshold for an "attack" is unclear. That is the gap the editorial identifies.
Syllabus mapping: GS3 – S&T: Space technology, indigenisation, defence applications | GS3 – Internal Security: cyber security, external state/non-state actors | GS2 – IR/Governance: international norms on outer space | Prelims – S&T (Space, Defence)
Background primer
Indian Space Policy 2023
- What it is:
- A policy approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security, which seeks to institutionalise private-sector participation while ISRO focuses on R&D of advanced space technologies. It is a policy document, not a law.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and ISSAR
- What it is:
- SSA is the monitoring of objects and activity in orbit. It covers collision avoidance, tracking of debris, and prediction of re-entries. It aims to protect national space assets from hazards such as debris and natural objects.
- Why it matters:
- Safe operations and attribution depend on knowing what is in orbit. The editorial wants SSA to also inform decisions on hostile disruption.
Defence Space Agency (DSA)
- What it is:
- A tri-service military body for space. It has command over the space assets of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
- Founded:
- Set up in 2019 (sources differ slightly on the exact date). It draws personnel from all three services and is headquartered in Bengaluru.
Jamming, spoofing and cyber interference (concepts)
Additional context
- Existing military-space moves.
- In April 2025 the CDS said India was working on a military space doctrine, expected within two to three months. Whether it has been published is not confirmed from a trusted source.
- The doctrine was to address anti-satellite weapons, space debris and electronic warfare in space.
- A 52-satellite defence constellation was approved, of which 31 are to be built by the private sector with ISRO.
- Mission Shakti (2019). India became the fourth nation, after the US, Russia and China, able to destroy a satellite in LEO.
- ISSAR-2025 figures on orbital congestion.
- 328 launch attempts in 2025, of which 315 succeeded.
- More than 1,50,000 alerts for ISRO's satellites were analysed.
- There were 18 collision-avoidance manoeuvres (4 GEO, 14 LEO).
- 144 Indian spacecraft had been launched by end-2025. The Government owned 22 operational satellites in LEO and 31 in GEO.
- Indigenous SSA capability. ISRO has committed to debris-free space missions by 2030. NETRA and a Multi-Object Tracking Radar at Sriharikota are among its indigenous efforts.
- India's declaratory stance. India advocates peaceful, civilian use of outer space and opposes weaponisation, citing the Conference on Disarmament.
Mains dimensions
- Changing threat: destruction to disruption.
- The editorial argues the shift complicates attribution.
- Non-kinetic attacks fall below traditional "armed attack" thresholds.
- Temporary effects can still be severe for military operations and essential services.
- Doctrine gap.
- India has the Indian Space Policy 2023 and SSA reporting. It lacks thresholds, attribution standards and response principles for disruption.
- The Policy 2023 is a policy document, not a statute. It mainly delineates the roles of ISRO, NSIL and IN-SPACe and opens the sector to private players. The military space doctrine was reported in April 2025 as under preparation. Its publication is not confirmed here.
- Civil-military and public-private integration.
- Commercial operators now support communications, navigation and civilian infrastructure.
- Disruption of a commercial system hits public services, businesses and national security.
- The article calls for sustained government–industry coordination on information sharing, vulnerability identification, response and continuity of essential services.
- Link: IN-SPACe and NSIL under the 2023 policy, and the 31 privately built satellites in the defence constellation.
- Resilience over capability accumulation. Redundancy, multiple systems, rapid reconstitution and launch-on-demand.
- Escalation management. Uncertain attribution and crisis stability. A doctrine must prescribe proportionate responses.
- Normative position.
- The article stresses "peaceful use" and avoiding weaponisation.
- This is consistent with India's declaratory position, though India has conducted Mission Shakti (2019), and its DSA commands the military's anti-satellite capability while the DSRO is tasked with space-warfare systems.
- This is a strategic-autonomy dilemma (deterrence versus the space commons).
- Limits.
- The piece offers no concrete thresholds and gives no mechanism for legal or institutional ownership.
- It does not address the international law gap (Outer Space Treaty regime versus cyber and electronic interference).
- Way forward.
- Publish a declaratory doctrine.
- Set up an attribution capability.
- Strengthen SSA (NETRA).
- Pass a national space law.
- Run government-industry exercises.
Possible Mains question
**GS3, 15 marks:** "Space-enabled services have become critical infrastructure for India's economy and defence. In this light, discuss the changing nature of threats to space assets and examine the case for a comprehensive space-security doctrine for India."
Related topics
- Outer Space Treaty (1967) and space law; weaponisation of outer space; Conference on Disarmament
- Mission Shakti (2019) and ASAT capabilities
- Defence Space Agency, DSRO, and tri-service integration
- Space debris, Kessler syndrome and collision avoidance; NETRA
- IN-SPACe, NSIL, private participation in space (Skyroot, Agnikul and others)
- Cyber security and critical information infrastructure (NCIIPC)
- Navigation systems: NavIC, GPS spoofing
Topics: GS3Sci & Tech
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