New Delhi’s ‘balancing act’ risks eroding Russia’s trust
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Source: The Hindu, 28 October 2026
Summary
- The author argues that at the SCO Summit in Bishkek (31 Aug–1 Sep 2026) and the BRICS Summit in New Delhi (12–13 Sep 2026), India made two surprising moves. It endorsed the Bishkek Declaration criticising the attacks on Iran, and PM Modi publicly urged Putin to end the Ukraine war.
- He reads this as strain on India's multi-alignment. India is trying to accommodate Russia and China, keep the BRICS presidency a success and reassure Washington, all at once.
- His conclusion: this "performative" diplomacy, seen as selective, may erode Russian trust. The India–Russia relationship is becoming transactional while Russia leans more towards China.
Key facts for Prelims
- SCO: est. 2001; 10 members; India joined 2017; Secretariat in Beijing; RATS in Tashkent.
- 26th SCO Summit: Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 31 August–1 September 2026; Bishkek Declaration. Pakistan holds the next presidency.
- 18th BRICS Summit: New Delhi, 12–13 September 2026; New Delhi Declaration; India's fourth BRICS chairship. China chairs BRICS in 2027.
- Samarkand SCO Summit, 16 September 2022: Modi's "not an era of war" remark to Putin.
- India–Russia: Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership; Strategic Partnership Declaration of October 2000.
- Operation Sindoor (2025) is the reference point for India–Pakistan conflict in the editorial.
- Strategic autonomy / multi-alignment is India's foreign-policy doctrine.
- Iran is a member of both SCO and BRICS, like India (per the article).
Data and details
- Bishkek Declaration (India endorsed):
- condemned attacks on Iran as violations of international law;
- reaffirmed Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- mourned the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in US–Israeli air strikes on 28 February 2026;
- did not name the US or Israel.
- In both the Bishkek and Delhi Declarations, India signed on to strong criticism of Israel and strong affirmation of Palestinian rights and the two-state solution. This departs from India's earlier avoidance of accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, and from its work to soften language critical of Washington and Tel Aviv. India had supported UN ceasefire resolutions and Palestinian statehood.
- Modi and Xi did not meet bilaterally at Bishkek. They held talks on the BRICS sidelines in Delhi. That meeting preceded Xi's "G2" summit with President Trump in Washington in September 2026.
- Neither summit declaration mentioned the war in Ukraine, so Moscow was not criticised. India endorsed two declarations accommodating Russia's position without fully embracing it.
- Samarkand 2022: Modi told Putin "today's era is not an era of war". Jaishankar repeated it in western capitals to show Russian oil purchases did not imply political support.
- The author says Modi has not used comparable language toward Netanyahu or Trump on the strikes on Iran, even though India itself attacked Pakistan in Operation Sindoor.
- Modi's latest appeal: "endless war" must give way to "end of war".
- Russia still needs India as a major buyer of oil and military equipment. India has steadily reduced dependence on Russian arms by turning to France, Israel and the US.
- Context for India's incentives:
- Since Operation Sindoor, India has faced perceived diplomatic marginalisation.
- Washington chose Islamabad as a mediator in the Iran conflict.
- Several Gulf nations have sought defence agreements with Pakistan.
- A successful BRICS summit needed Putin and Xi to attend.
- The author's claims are opinion, including that the relationship is "transactional" and that Russia leans to China, its "trusted partner".
Static–dynamic linkage
The static concept is strategic autonomy / multi-alignment. This is India's post-Cold War development of non-alignment: engaging all major powers and forums (G-7, SCO, BRICS, Quad) on issue-by-issue interests without joining a bloc. Its test is consistency. When India supports contradictory positions across forums, partners may read its stance as tactical rather than principled.
Syllabus mapping: GS2 – IR: India and its relations with major powers; bilateral, regional and global groupings; effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests.
Background primer
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
- What it is:
- A Eurasian political, economic and international security organisation established in 2001.
- Members:
- India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Belarus. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in July 2024.
- Mandate:
- Security cooperation against terrorism, separatism and extremism.
- Why it matters:
- A platform for non-Western multilateralism; the 2026 Bishkek Declaration reaffirmed that the SCO is not a military-political alliance or directed against any country.
Bishkek Declaration (2026)
- What it is:
- The consensus-based joint communiqué adopted by SCO heads of state at their 26th summit. The summit marked the SCO's 25th anniversary and transferred the presidency to Pakistan.
BRICS
- What it is:
- A grouping of major emerging economies, expanded to include more members in recent years.
India–Russia relationship
Additional context
- Bishkek on Iran: The declaration condemned unilateral military strikes on Iran as violations of international law and called for a diplomatic resolution.
- Modi–Putin at Bishkek: PM Modi urged Putin to move from "endless war towards end of war" in a meeting on the SCO sidelines. The two leaders also discussed trade, investment, and energy and fertiliser security.
- Delhi BRICS Declaration: It expressed deep concern over escalation in West Asia, called for maximum restraint, and urged protection of civilians and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. It condemned unilateral coercive measures, including non-UN Security Council sanctions. It also backed Iran's and Ethiopia's WTO accession bids. It was adopted unanimously, with Putin and Xi among the leaders attending.
- Delhi Modi–Putin bilateral: They met on the BRICS sidelines, less than two weeks after their Bishkek meeting. They discussed trade ties and implementing the Programme for Economic Cooperation 2030. Putin invited Modi to Russia for the 24th India–Russia Annual Summit.
- Later development (November): The MEA spokesperson said India had conveyed ideas to both Russia and Ukraine, including on Black Sea shipping safety, energy and grain exports, and non-attack arrangements. Modi spoke to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy on 9 November.
- Strategic relevance of SCO to India: It offers a platform for counter-terror cooperation, engagement with Central Asia, connectivity via INSTC and Chabahar, and strategic autonomy.
Mains dimensions
- Strain on multi-alignment: India wants to support Israel while condemning attacks on Iran, buy Russian oil while leaning towards the West on Ukraine, and stay central to BRICS and SCO while telling Washington it is not part of an anti-American bloc. These aims pull in different directions.
- Domestic and diplomatic incentives: A successful BRICS chairship needed Putin and Xi in Delhi. Post-Sindoor perceptions of marginalisation, Pakistan's rising profile with Washington, and Gulf–Pakistan defence ties raised the cost of an unsuccessful summit.
- Consistency vs selectivity: The author argues India's "not an era of war" message is applied selectively (Russia but not Israel or the US), which weakens its credibility as a principle. Counter-view: states calibrate rhetoric to their interests, and India's private diplomacy with all sides continues.
- Public vs private messaging: The author reads Modi's public appeal to Putin as a signal to the West. A critic would answer that India has repeatedly stated its peace-seeking position and now conveys concrete ideas to Russia and Ukraine.
- India–Russia ties becoming transactional: The oil and arms linkages persist, but India's diversification of arms sources (France, Israel, US) and Russia's tilt towards China may change the relationship's balance.
- SCO and BRICS as platforms: They let India project strategic autonomy and Global South leadership, but consensus texts can bind India to positions that sit awkwardly with its Western and Israeli partnerships. Declarations that avoid naming Russia on Ukraine and the US/Israel on Iran show how consensus is managed.
- Way forward: Articulate a consistent principle-based position across conflicts, keep defence and energy ties with Russia while diversifying, use BRICS chairship leverage, and use backchannels instead of public admonitions.
Possible Mains question
**GS2, 15 marks:** "India's policy of multi-alignment is increasingly difficult to sustain amid contending pressures from Russia, China and the West. Examine with reference to India's positions at the 2026 SCO and BRICS summits."
Related topics
- Strategic autonomy and the evolution of non-alignment
- India–Russia defence and energy ties; diversification of arms imports
- BRICS: expansion, New Development Bank, India's chairship
- India's West Asia policy: Iran (Chabahar/INSTC), Israel and Palestine two-state position
- Quad and India–US relations; India–China relations (border, trade)
- SCO and counter-terrorism: RATS, "double standards" language
Topics: GS2Polity
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