BrainParrot

Surveillance is not the only privacy issue

GS2Full notePublished: · Updated:

Source: The Hindu, 30 September 2026

Summary

  • The editorial reads three 2026 developments as one pattern. In August the Supreme Court disposed of a PIL on doxxing and deepfakes and asked Union Ministries to take remedial measures. In July, Rajya Sabha MP A.A. Rahim petitioned the Court against Delhi Police's use of facial recognition and biometric surveillance during the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests. In May the Court upheld the Election Commission's Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.
  • The author argues that the State's cameras, private vendors, online doxxing networks and roll-revision exercises are linked, and that India's privacy law tackles only one link. She asks for surveillance to be treated as a diffuse act spread across states, companies and foreign vendors, not as a discrete act by one identifiable actor.

UPSC relevance: GS2 — Polity (fundamental rights, privacy, electoral governance); GS3 — Science & Technology (surveillance tech, data protection)

Key facts for Prelims

  • Right to privacy: Article 21 and Part III. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) was decided by a nine-judge Bench, and it overruled M.P. Sharma and (in part) Kharak Singh.
  • Triple test for any State intrusion on privacy: legality, legitimate state aim, proportionality.
  • DPDP Act, 2023: the Union may exempt any State instrumentality by notification, on grounds including security of the State and public order (Section 17).
  • ECI's SIR rests on Article 324 and Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Section 16 bars non-citizens from enrolment, and Article 326 gives adult suffrage to citizens aged 18 and above.
  • The ECI may examine citizenship only for the limited purpose of the electoral roll. It cannot itself decide citizenship.
  • Pegasus is spyware made by Israel's NSO Group. The SC-appointed technical committee was overseen by Justice R.V. Raveendran (retd.).
  • PUCL v. Union of India (1997): phone tapping is permissible only with legal authority and procedural safeguards.
  • The IT Act, 2000 and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 are the older surveillance statutes with no independent oversight.

Data and details

  • Bihar SIR began with about 7.89 crore electors and ended with a final roll of 7.42 crore, a net fall of roughly 0.47 crore.
  • The Rahim petition alleges Delhi Police used facial recognition, AI-enabled smart glasses, drones and a mobile command vehicle at Jantar Mantar. It also alleges the data was hosted by two private firms.
  • Women who took part in the CJP protests were later doxxed, with personal details published along with reported rape and death threats.
  • Pegasus, allegedly used against journalists, activists and others:
  • In 2022 the court-appointed expert committee reported malware in some phones it examined, but could not say for sure whether it was Pegasus.
  • It noted that the Union government had not cooperated.
  • In 2025 the SC indicated that parts of the report would not be made public.
  • The article notes the State's interest in identifying individuals predates Aadhaar by more than 150 years.
  • Historical: In 1858, William Herschel, a British magistrate, began taking handprints on contracts. The technique was later developed into a fingerprint classification system in Bengal.
  • In March 2020, the UP administration put up hoardings in Lucknow with the photographs and addresses of CAA protesters. The Allahabad High Court ordered them removed, calling the display an "unwarranted interference in privacy".
  • Timeline of the three strands: May 2026 (SIR upheld), July 2026 (Rahim petition), August 2026 (doxxing/deepfakes PIL disposed of).
  • The article says India has no clear answers to three questions:
  • Who is responsible when a protester is identified by a camera, doxxed by anonymous accounts and then threatened at home?
  • What happens to privacy when an electoral-roll decision determines whether someone can vote?
  • Which safeguard applies when police-gathered data is held by a private company?

Static–dynamic linkage

Privacy is a fundamental right under Art. 21. The 2017 Puttaswamy ruling says any State intrusion must meet three tests: legality, a legitimate aim and proportionality. The article's point is a gap between doctrine and practice. The constitutional test is framed around State action, but today's harms pass through private vendors, anonymous online actors and administrative exercises (such as roll revision) that use identity data to decide entitlements. Statutory law (the DPDP Act) lets the Union exempt State instrumentalities, and the court-appointed independent Pegasus committee noted the Union's non-cooperation.

Syllabus mapping: GS2 – Polity: Fundamental Rights (Art. 21, right to privacy); statutory bodies & EC; Parliament-made laws and their exemptions | GS3 – S&T: IT/cyber security, data protection | Prelims – Polity (Constitution, rights, elections)

Background primer

Right to Privacy — *K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India* (2017)

What it is:
A nine-judge Supreme Court bench unanimously declared privacy a fundamental right on 24 August 2017. It is an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and of the freedoms in Part III.
Mandate:
Any restriction on privacy must satisfy a triple test: legality (a valid law), a legitimate state aim, and proportionality. Three aspects are recognised: bodily intrusion, informational privacy and privacy of choice.
Why it matters:
Privacy is a "natural right" inhering in human beings, not a gift from the State. The judgment also noted that dangers to informational privacy can come from non-State actors as well as the State, and it entrusted the Union Government with putting a robust data-protection regime in place.

Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023

What it is:
It was enacted on 11 August 2023. It places obligations on Data Fiduciaries and sets out the rights and duties of Data Principals.

Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls

What it is:
A focused, time-bound exercise by the ECI to update and verify the accuracy of electoral rolls.

Pegasus and the Supreme Court's technical committee

What it is:
Pegasus is spyware developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group.

Additional context

  • On the SIR ruling: The Court regarded the process as constitutionally compliant because of safeguards added during the hearings, most notably accepting the Aadhaar card as a valid document. It ordered the ECI to refer all persons deleted on citizenship grounds to the competent authority within four weeks, with voting rights restored if they are found to be citizens.
  • On the SIR's phased conduct: The SIR was first undertaken in Bihar before the 2025 Assembly elections, starting 24 June 2025. The draft roll of 1 August 2025 left out about 65 lakh names of electors who were deceased, had permanently migrated, were listed in duplicate or could not be traced.
  • On Bihar's roll numbers: The ECI published the final roll on 30 September 2025 with nearly 7.42 crore electors. The draft roll of 1 August 2025 had 7.24 crore. At the claims-and-objections stage, 21.53 lakh eligible electors were added and 3.66 lakh ineligible electors were removed.
  • On the DPDP framework: A pending case, Venkatesh Nayak v. Union of India (2026), questions the DPDP framework on grounds including the right to information, excessive government access to personal data and inadequate safeguards against surveillance.
  • On the Pegasus committee's process: The committee submitted its final report in a sealed cover, which was resealed and kept in the custody of the SC Secretary General.

Mains dimensions

  • State-action-centred doctrine vs diffuse harm: Puttaswamy was decided in a case against the State and its test is framed around State action. Yet in the CJP episode the harm travelled through camera, private host, anonymous accounts and home threats. No single actor is accountable, and the Article 21 test bites at only one point in the chain.
  • Statutory carve-outs weaken the constitutional promise: The DPDP Act lets the Union exempt any State instrumentality by notification, on security of the State and public order grounds. Exempted agencies largely fall outside the Act's obligations, which sits uneasily with the proportionality requirement.
  • Private-vendor dependence: Police data from Jantar Mantar is alleged to be hosted by two private firms, and Pegasus is a foreign vendor's product. The law has no clear safeguard for State data held by companies or foreign suppliers.
  • Accountability deficit in the Pegasus precedent: The independent committee found malware but could not confirm Pegasus, noted the Union's non-cooperation, and parts of its report were later withheld. Judicial oversight without disclosure leaves surveillance questions unresolved.
  • Identity checks as exclusion risk (SIR): The Court allowed the ECI to examine citizenship for roll purposes only. Critics warned of exclusion of eligible voters, and the final Bihar roll was smaller than the starting roll (7.89 → 7.42 crore). Here a data-and-identity decision determines the franchise, so privacy, citizenship and voting rights intersect.
  • Doxxing as punishment: The 2020 Lucknow hoardings (ordered removed by the Allahabad HC) and the CJP doxxing are the same impulse at different speeds. A hoarding needed an administration, while today a photo is identified, amplified and linked to an address within hours. Women protesters bear gendered threats.
  • Continuity of the identification impulse: From Herschel's 1858 handprints to Aadhaar, Delhi's cameras and the SIR, the State has always sought a legible population. Scale and speed are what is new, so the safeguards have to be new too.
  • Way forward (implied): Treat surveillance as a diffuse act across states, companies and foreign vendors. Fix responsibility at each link. Align statutory exemptions with the proportionality test. Provide independent oversight for State surveillance and clear rules for State data held by private firms.

Possible Mains question

**GS2, 15 marks:** "The constitutional protection of privacy in *Puttaswamy* is framed around State action, but contemporary threats to privacy are diffuse, spanning the State, private firms and online networks. Critically examine whether India's legal framework is adequate to address this."

Related topics

  • Article 21 and the "golden triangle" (Arts. 14, 19, 21); proportionality doctrine
  • Aadhaar judgment (2018) and the DPDP Act, 2023 / Data Protection Board
  • RTI Act vs privacy (Section 8(1)(j)); Information Technology Act, 2000 (Section 69) and Telegraph Act surveillance rules
  • Election Commission (Art. 324), electoral roll revision, Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Sections 16, 19, 21), Art. 326
  • Deepfakes, cyber security and intermediary liability

Topics: GS2Polity

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