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Cyber fraud victims dissatisfied with banks over delayed action and poor recover...

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Source: The Hindu, 7 October 2026

Summary

  • Two pieces based on the Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2026 on cybercrime look at digital financial fraud from two angles.
  • One shows victims' dissatisfaction with banks' delayed action, blame-shifting and poor recovery.
  • The other shows that the more people use and trust UPI and online banking, the more likely they are to be victims.
  • Both point to organised fraud networks that exploit mule accounts, and to accountability gaps in the banking system.

UPSC relevance: GS3/GS2 — Cybercrime, digital payments, banking accountability, policing

Key facts for Prelims

  • RBI's 2017 circular on "Customer Protection – Limiting Liability of Customers in Unauthorised Electronic Banking Transactions" (6 July 2017): zero liability if reported within 3 working days (third-party breach); shadow reversal within 10 working days.
  • I4C: set up by MHA. NCRP: cybercrime.gov.in. National Cyber Crime Helpline: 1930.
  • The Citizen Financial Cyber Fraud Reporting and Management System (CFCFRMS) connects banks and police.
  • Mule account: a bank account used to receive and move proceeds of fraud.
  • "Police" and "Public Order" are State subjects (Seventh Schedule, State List).
  • SPIR is produced by Lokniti–CSDS and Common Cause.
  • UPI: the real-time interbank payment system run by NPCI.

Data and details

  • Sample: 8,306 respondents in 16 States/UTs, plus in-depth interviews with 37 stakeholders (victims, cybercrime experts and others).
  • 13% of respondents were victims of cybercrime in the last 2–3 years. 54% of these victims suffered digital financial fraud.
  • 52% of digital financial fraud victims complained separately to the bank. 63% of these did so within 24 hours.
  • Among those who complained to the bank, 40% believed a bank insider leaked their data. Among those who did not complain separately, the figure was 26%.
  • Of 13 digital financial fraud victims interviewed in depth, 5 thought bank officials were directly or indirectly complicit. One was told by the investigating police officer that the bank must be complicit, though no charges were filed against it.
  • Satisfaction: more than 1 in 5 victims were "very dissatisfied" with the bank's role in recovering money, and 16% were "somewhat dissatisfied". Interviewed victims rated banks 1 out of 5. Satisfaction stayed low even when money was recovered fully or partly, with no notable difference between private and public sector banks.
  • Banks' standard response was that the victim "collaborated" with the fraudster. All interviewed victims but one heard this, including victims who never interacted with the perpetrator. The exception was a high net-worth individual with a long relationship with the bank.
  • Case: a Gurgaon journalist (name changed) got a Saturday scam call for "SIM upgradation" from a caller posing as an Airtel employee, who knew his name, date of birth, Aadhaar and debit card number. ₹5,000 was withdrawn from a payment wallet the next day. He blocked his number and emailed the bank (closed on Sunday). By Monday afternoon the account was not blocked, and fraudsters had taken a ₹5 lakh loan on his credit card, half of which was withdrawn. He described the bank as taking "zero accountability".
  • Experts and former police officials said banks lack due diligence in opening accounts that become mule accounts. One said ordinary customers lose access over KYC while criminals' accounts are never closed. They also pointed to a lack of accountability for customer data leakages.
  • UPI processed over 24,000 crore transactions in FY 2025–26, with value crossing ₹314 lakh crore. About 70% of the population is online.
  • 49% use UPI apps every day, and 24% once or twice a week. 48% use UPI "many times", ahead of card, wallet and NEFT/RTGS.
  • Trust: UPI is "very safe" for 34% and "somewhat safe" for 41%. Cards: 65% consider them safe (28% very, 37% somewhat). Wallets and mobile banking apps follow. Across all online modes, 23% say "very safe" and 40% "somewhat safe".
  • Trust paradox: among the most vulnerable to unsafe online practices, 49% called online banking "very safe" and 39% "somewhat safe". Among moderately or non-vulnerable respondents, about one-fifth on average said "very safe".
  • Among victims, 28% considered online banking "very safe", against 14% who considered it "very unsafe". Heavy UPI users were likelier to have been victims than non-users.
  • A cybercrime expert described a supply chain of "kits" (pre-activated SIM cards, bank accounts, phones) costing ₹10,000–20,000. Fraudsters can use them to take tens of lakhs or crores and stay largely untraceable.
  • Reported schemes include fake investment and betting apps and "digital arrest" holding victims for days.
  • Two interviewed accused said fraudsters tricked them into lending their bank accounts, so users are recruited as the most replaceable link in the chain.

Static–dynamic linkage

  • Digital finance has raised convenience and inclusion, but also exposure to fraud. The regulatory response rests on two pillars. The first is a liability framework that decides who bears a loss: customer, bank or "elsewhere in the system". The second is a reporting and response architecture (the 1930 helpline, NCRP and CFCFRMS) that connects police and banks.
  • "Police" and "public order" are State subjects. Banking regulation is with RBI and cybercrime coordination is with MHA's I4C. Effective redress therefore needs coordination across three sets of institutions.

Syllabus mapping: GS3 – Economy: banking, digital payments (UPI), financial inclusion | GS3 – Internal Security: cyber crime, money laundering, mule accounts | GS2 – Governance: consumer protection, grievance redress, police reforms

Background primer

RBI framework on limiting customer liability in unauthorised electronic banking transactions (2017)

What it is:
An RBI circular of 6 July 2017, issued to commercial banks, small finance banks and payments banks, on customer protection and limiting liability. It was issued amid an increased thrust on financial inclusion and customer protection.
Why it matters:
A balance between ease of use and security of transactions amid rapid digitalisation.

Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), MHA

What it is:
An attached office of the Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with all types of cyber crime in a coordinated way.

Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2026

What it is:
Published jointly by Lokniti–CSDS and Common Cause. The survey covered 8,306 respondents across 16 States/UTs, plus interviews with 37 stakeholders.

Additional context

  • RBI issued draft revised instructions on liability in unauthorised electronic transactions on 6 March 2026, including a compensation mechanism for small-value fraud. PIB describes the revised framework as adding AI-driven fraud analytics and safeguards against mule accounts. After considering feedback, RBI issued the final Amendment Directions on 24 June 2026, effective 1 January 2027.
  • I4C data (PIB, as of 30 June 2026): more than ₹11,158 crore saved in over 32.80 lakh complaints through the financial fraud reporting system. More than 30.48 lakh suspect identifiers and 32.08 lakh Layer-1 mule accounts were shared with Suspect Registry participants, with declined transactions worth ₹25,698 crore.
  • Mule accounts (I4C alert): Accounts are scouted mainly through Telegram and Facebook and controlled remotely from overseas. I4C advises citizens not to sell or rent bank accounts, and notes that banks should deploy checks for misuse.
  • Other SPIR 2026 findings (Insights on India): NCRB data show cybercrime up 17.9%, from 86,420 cases in 2023 to 1,01,928 in 2024, against a 6% fall in overall registered crime. About 39% of victims abandon the process without lodging a formal complaint, and 27% of complainants paid a bribe to the police.

Mains dimensions

  • Liability framework vs. practice: The 2017 RBI rule (bank bears the entire loss if the customer reports within 3 days and neither side is at fault) was reportedly extended on a pilot basis in 2026 to scam payments where the customer was tricked, with limited bank liability. In practice, victims report blame-shifting ("collaborated"), delayed blocking (Gurgaon case), and little accountability for the cost of recovery, even though banks are liable when negligence is shown.
  • Bank-side security and accountability: 40% of victims who complained to the bank suspect an insider data leak, and 5 of 13 interviewees suspect complicity. Experts cite weak account-opening due diligence that creates mule accounts. This calls for stronger KYC and monitoring, insider-risk controls, and sanctions on banks.
  • Trust paradox: High usage breeds high trust, which can lower caution. Highly vulnerable users were the most confident (49% "very safe"). The policy lesson is that rising usage needs matching digital and behavioural literacy.
  • Organised, industrialised fraud: Kit supply chains (₹10,000–20,000), digital arrest, fake apps, and recruited account-lenders who become the "replaceable link". Enforcement has to target the mule-account ecosystem and its financiers, not just the account-lenders.
  • Institutional coordination: Fast fund freezing depends on the 1930/CFCFRMS bank–police chain. Policing is a State subject, banking regulation is with RBI, and I4C coordinates. Response delays and bank unresponsiveness weaken this chain.
  • Equity and trust in digital economy: Poor recovery experience can erode confidence in digital payments. Experience is similar across public and private banks, so this is a systemic issue.

Possible Mains question

**GS3, 15 marks:** "As digital payments expand, so does cyber financial fraud. Analyse the accountability gaps of banks and the institutional framework for recovery, and suggest measures to protect users without undermining digital adoption."

Related topics

  • RBI Ombudsman Scheme and customer protection; KYC and PMLA; mule accounts
  • UPI and NPCI; Digital Payments Intelligence; payment fraud monitoring
  • I4C, NCRP, 1930 helpline; IT Act, 2000; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
  • Police reforms and State subjects (Seventh Schedule); cyber forensic capacity
  • "Digital arrest" scams; digital literacy

Topics: GS3Economy

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