BrainParrot

The murky world of political party finance

GS2Full notePublished: · Updated:

Source: The Hindu, 25 September 2026

Summary

  • Prompted by a BBC investigation that revealed extraordinary donations to six Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs), the editorial argues that political finance in India is opaque and under-regulated. It cites ADR and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) data on RUPP incomes and party wealth.
  • It proposes remedies: a court-monitored probe into electoral bonds and shell RUPPs, CAG audit of parties, expenditure limits for parties, automatic deregistration of inactive RUPPs, a central portal for party finances, and ECI action under Art. 324.

UPSC relevance: GS2 — Polity: Electoral reforms, political parties, ECI, transparency in political funding

Key facts for Prelims

  • Section 29A, RP Act, 1951: registration of political parties with ECI; Section 29B: contributions (not from Government companies; foreign funds barred by FCRA); Section 29C: declaration of donations above Rs 20,000.
  • Section 13A, Income-tax Act, 1961: tax exemption for parties, conditional on records and reporting.
  • Parties are not defined in the Constitution except via the Tenth Schedule; they are associations under Art. 19(1)(c).
  • RUPP = Registered Unrecognised Political Party; "delisting" ≠ "deregistration"; the ECI's general lack of power to deregister parties.
  • Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968: Order 6 (recognised vs. unrecognised parties); Order 16A (inserted by T.N. Seshan): suspend or withdraw recognition of a recognised party for failure to follow the MCC or lawful directions.
  • Section 29A, paragraph 3(xxiii) of the ECI's registration guidelines: the party must declare it will contest elections within five years; it will be taken off the list if it does not contest continuously for six years.
  • Electoral Bond Scheme 2018: declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2024; eligibility required at least 1% of votes.
  • Art. 324: the ECI's "reservoir of authority" (Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi).
  • CIC's 2013 order bringing parties under the RTI Act (resisted by political parties; not enforced).
  • Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) and Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR): civil society sources of political finance data.

Data and details

  • ADR report (18 July 2025): 223% rise in declared income of RUPPs in FY2022-23; of 2,764 RUPPs, only 739 submitted financial records to the ECI.
  • ECI press note "Cleaning up the Electoral System" (9 August 2025): 334 of 2,854 RUPPs delisted.
  • T.N. Seshan's order of 16 October 1994 (under the Symbols Order) criticised "adhocism" and the "sorry state of affairs" in parties and warned that the ECI would not remain a "mute spectator".
  • BBC investigation: extraordinary donations to six RUPPs.
  • 22 parties had ₹18,742.31 crore at their disposal for the 2024 general election, including ₹7,416.31 crore in donations raised between the announcement and the completion of the election.
  • After the election, ₹14,848.46 crore remained (cash, bank balances and fixed deposits), after ₹3,861.57 crore of election-related spending.
  • Over the last decade the exchequer "lost" ₹11,813 crore in taxes through exemptions on political donations.
  • Individuals and HUFs now overtake corporates: in FY2022-23, individuals claimed exemptions worth ₹2,275.85 crore, against ₹514.4 crore by corporates and ₹115.71 crore by firms and associations.
  • Declared donations rose from ₹714 crore (43 parties) in 2015-16 to ₹7,203 crore (27 parties) in 2023-24.
  • Only 41.76% of donations (₹28,287 crore over nine years) were claimed as tax-exempt, which raises questions about the remaining 58% (Nayak: what incentives drive donations without tax relief?).
  • Electoral bonds were introduced in 2018 and struck down in 2024; most RUPPs were ineligible (1% vote threshold), yet large contributions went to them. Who contributed, and why?
  • Parties jointly resisted the 2013 CIC order bringing them under the RTI Act; neither the ECI nor the Supreme Court has enforced it.
  • The Income-Tax Department and ED may not prioritise scrutiny of party accounts; the ECI lacks the mandate, intent or means to question accounts and only checks that they are submitted.

Static–dynamic linkage

Political parties have no standing as a distinct constitutional entity (except under the Tenth Schedule) and operate as "associations" under Art. 19. They are regulated through registration (s.29A, RP Act), receipt of contributions (s.29B), reporting of donations (s.29C) and tax exemption (s.13A, Income-tax Act), but weak enforcement means sparse transparency. The editorial links this to the electoral bonds judgment, the ECI's limited powers to deregister parties, and the RTI question.

Syllabus mapping: GS2 – Polity: Representation of the People Act (Sections 29A, 29B, 29C), Election Commission's powers, electoral reforms, role of political parties; GS2 – Governance: transparency and accountability; GS3 – Economy: tax exemptions and black money.

Background primer

Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs)

What it is:
Parties registered with the ECI under Section 29A of the RP Act, 1951 that have not qualified as State or National parties.
Why it matters:
Registration was meant to give genuine political associations a legal identity; the editorial's argument is that it is being exploited by "shell" parties.

Legal framework for political funding

Electoral Bond Scheme (2018) — struck down in 2024

What it is:
A bearer instrument like a promissory note, purchasable by any Indian citizen or Indian-incorporated body, with no donor name on the bond.

Additional context

  • The ECI began the 2025 delisting drive in June 2025 by directing State/UT Chief Electoral Officers to verify 345 RUPPs. The check covered whether they had contested elections for six years running (since 2019) and whether they existed at their registered addresses. The CEOs held show-cause notices and hearings. The ECI then delisted 334 on 9 August 2025 and referred the rest back for reverification.
  • The ECI's delisting order says delisted RUPPs are not eligible for benefits under Sections 29B and 29C of the RP Act, the Income-tax Act and the Symbols Order. The editorial questions whether donations to such parties still qualified for tax exemption in practice.
  • A second round followed in August 2025, when the ECI identified another 476 RUPPs for delisting. A later PIB release reports that another 474 were delisted and proceedings were started against 359 more.

Mains dimensions

  • Legal vacuum on parties: There is no legal definition of a party's character (company, trust, society, etc.), yet parties enjoy unusually generous tax exemption. This allows "shell political parties" to operate like shell companies.
  • Weak ECI enforcement: The ECI can only delist, not deregister (a 2002 Supreme Court ruling limits deregistration); delisted or unrecognised parties may still receive contributions under Section 29B; Order 16A to curb non-compliance with the MCC is rarely used; and the commission accepts accounts mechanically. Only 739 of 2,764 RUPPs filed records, and even the delisting drive covered 334 of 2,854.
  • Transparency deficit: Electoral bonds removed disclosure, and the Supreme Court's 2024 invalidation leaves unanswered questions about donors and quid pro quo. Parties have refused RTI coverage. The scale of funds (₹18,742 crore for 2024) and the post-poll balance (₹14,848 crore) show the magnitude.
  • Fiscal impact: ₹11,813 crore of tax revenue forgone over a decade; most donations (about 58%) were not claimed as tax-exempt, which the CHRI researcher says raises unanswered questions about donor motives.
  • Reforms proposed: (i) court-monitored probe into electoral bonds and shell RUPPs; (ii) CAG audit under ECI's Art. 324 powers; (iii) a cap on party expenditure during elections, which the ECI has recommended repeatedly; (iv) tax exemption limited to the expenditure cap, with other donations fully taxed; (v) automatic deregistration of RUPPs that do not contest; (vi) a centralised digital portal with standardised financial data.
  • Institutional priorities: The author contrasts the ECI scrutinising parties and funding with its current focus on "chasing genuine electors off the rolls", a reference to the controversy over deletion of genuine electors from the rolls. The point of view is an editorial opinion; the empirical claims are cited from ADR, CHRI and ECI.
  • Counter-considerations: Party autonomy under Art. 19(1)(c) and the limits on ECI's statutory powers mean a legislative amendment (RP Act, Income-tax Act) may be needed, not just ECI orders.

Possible Mains question

**GS2, 15 marks:** "Opacity in political party finance undermines free and fair elections. Examine the gaps in the legal framework governing political funding and the role of the Election Commission, and suggest reforms in light of the issue of Registered Unrecognised Political Parties."

Related topics

  • Electoral Bonds judgment (ADR v. Union of India, 2024); Companies Act s.182; Finance Act 2017
  • Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Sections 29A–29C); FCRA, 2010
  • CIC order on parties under RTI (2013); Dinesh Goswami Committee, Law Commission 255th Report, Second ARC on political funding
  • Election expenditure limits (candidates); electoral trusts; National Electoral Fund proposals
  • Cross-reference: the electoral-roll revision (SIR) controversy and ECI's credibility; the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968

Topics: GS2Polity

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