LAC ‘disturbed’ by PLA’s behaviour, admits MEA
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Source: The Hindu, 24 October 2026
Summary
- The MEA said the India–China border areas "get disturbed" from time to time when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns. It was responding to questions on a The Hindu report about skirmishes along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.
- That report quoted the outgoing ITBP Director-General Shatrujeet Kapur, who expressed concern over face-offs under way since July. The Congress attacked the Centre, and the video of Kapur's speech was deleted from the ITBP's official YouTube channel.
- This is the first time the Government has officially accepted that the borders stay tense, more than two years after Modi and Xi announced a military détente.
Key facts for Prelims
- LAC vs LoC: the LAC is the line with China (post-1962); the LoC is the India–Pakistan line (post-1972 Simla Agreement).
- LAC sectors: Western (Ladakh), Middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh) and Eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh).
- Depsang Plains lie about 30 km southeast of Daulat Beg Oldie near the Karakoram Pass and have flat terrain suited to military offensives. Under the October 2024 arrangement, patrolling up to the old Patrolling Points (PP 10–13) was to be restored in areas such as Depsang and Demchok (Charding Nullah).
- ITBP: CAPF under MHA, raised 1962. Border Security Force guards the Pakistan and Bangladesh borders; Assam Rifles guards the Myanmar border; SSB guards Nepal and Bhutan borders (textbook).
- Key agreements: 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 (WMCC) and 2013 (BDCA) as listed above.
- The military stand-off in Eastern Ladakh began in April/May 2020 with the Chinese troop build-up; the violent Galwan clashes followed in June 2020. The article refers to a "four-year military stand-off at the LAC, including the Galwan clashes in 2020".
Data and details
- MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal (briefing on Friday): the situation "gets disturbed from time to time" when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns. He blamed the PLA for the divergences.
- Jaiswal also said both sides continue to use existing diplomatic and military mechanisms to resolve outstanding issues and avoid "misunderstanding and miscalculation". He referred queries on the specific situation to the Ministry of Defence.
- Government position since the start of the four-year stand-off (including the 2020 Galwan clashes): peace and tranquillity in border areas are essential for overall bilateral relations. Both sides are in touch to improve understanding of the LAC for "better border management".
- The ITBP's outgoing DG Shatrujeet Kapur spoke at an event in Alwar on Thursday, expressing concern over "face-offs" under way since July. The video was later deleted from the ITBP's YouTube channel despite the MEA's confirmation.
- Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge asked PM Modi to explain "continuing face-offs" at several locations along the Arunachal border, and whether India's patrolling access had been compromised and the pre-May 2020 status quo restored. He called the ITBP chief's confirmation "deeply alarming".
- Kharge alleged that Modi's June 2020 statement that no one had entered Indian territory after Galwan emboldened China.
- Pawan Khera: commended the ITBP's "Shaurya Commandos" for handling the confrontations; accused the Government of suppressing information and valuing "image" over national interest.
- Jairam Ramesh (Congress): India's trade deficit with China reached a record $112 billion in 2025–26, up from $99 billion the previous year, hurting MSMEs; he said "Make in India has become Import from China". The Congress also questioned the easing of restrictions on Chinese investment. These are Opposition claims.
Static–dynamic linkage
- The LAC is not a delimited, mutually agreed boundary. India and China hold different perceptions of where it lies, so each side's patrols can encounter the other's. This explains face-offs "over patrolling routes" even without any change in formal agreements.
- Peace on the LAC has been managed through agreements and mechanisms: the 1993 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, the 1996 Confidence Building Measures agreement in the military field, the 2005 Protocol on CBM implementation, the Special Representatives talks (since 2003), WMCC (2012) and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (textbook). The MEA's phrasing ("peace and tranquility") echoes these.
- The Arunachal Pradesh face-offs belong to the Eastern Sector, whereas the 2024 patrolling agreement was about Depsang and Demchok in the Western Sector.
Syllabus mapping: GS2 — IR: India–China relations, border agreements; GS3 — Security: border management, role of CAPFs (ITBP), infrastructure along borders.
Background primer
Line of Actual Control (LAC)
- What it is:
- the demarcation separating Indian-controlled from Chinese-controlled territory, which came into existence after the 1962 war.
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)
- What it is:
- a Central Armed Police Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs, raised in 1962 after the India–China war (textbook).
- Mandate:
- guarding the India–China border, from the Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh, maintaining border-post presence at high altitude, plus disaster response and security duties.
- Why it matters:
- a specialised, high-altitude force for the border with Tibet.
Additional context
- The October 2024 patrolling arrangement: India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the LAC in Depsang and Demchok on 21 October 2024, leading to disengagement. Patrolling and, where applicable, grazing were to resume as per the longstanding practice before friction started. By the end of 2024, blocking positions had been removed, joint verification completed and patrolling had commenced to traditional patrolling areas in Depsang and Demchok.
- Phased logic: the arrangement is framed as part of a phased process of disengagement, de-escalation and de-induction. Disengagement at Galwan, Hot Springs, Gogra and the north and south banks of Pangong Tso had been completed earlier. In his 3 December 2024 Lok Sabha statement, EAM Jaishankar said disengagement had been achieved in full in Eastern Ladakh and that de-escalation (the massing of troops along the LAC) was the next priority.
- What the deal did not cover: the disengagement covered Depsang and Demchok, with earlier stand-off points such as Pangong Tso and Galwan remaining as they were. Commentary at the time also noted that it was unclear whether patrolling rights were restored along the entire LAC and what would happen to buffer zones.
- Government position in 2024: the MEA told Parliament that the agreements apply mutually to both sides and are without prejudice to India's positions on the LAC or boundary lines.
- Modi–Xi meeting: PM Modi met President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Russia in October 2024 and welcomed the patrolling agreement.
Mains dimensions
- Official acknowledgment but limited detail: the MEA blames the PLA but defers specifics to MoD, and the speech video was deleted. The mix of confirmation and information control feeds Opposition charges of "suppression", and raises the transparency question about border incidents.
- Pattern of divergent patrols: since the LAC is not mutually delineated, "established patrolling patterns" are the working norm. The accusation that China diverges from them points to violations of the 1993/1996 principles.
- Détente fragility: the Modi–Xi understanding more than two years ago eased the Western Sector, but face-offs "since July" in the Eastern Sector show that normalisation is partial. The 2024 deal was limited to Depsang and Demchok and left buffer-zone and de-escalation steps unclear.
- Status quo ante: Kharge's question about whether the pre-May 2020 position has been restored goes to the core of the 2024 arrangement. The Government's statements do not answer this in the article.
- Economic security linkage: the trade deficit and the easing of Chinese investment restrictions are the Opposition's link between border security and economic dependence. Whether the deficit "crushes" MSMEs is a claim the article attributes to Congress.
- Institutional dimension: the ITBP is the first responder on the Arunachal border and the visible role of the "Shaurya Commandos" shows reliance on CAPFs. Civil-military coordination (MoD, MHA, MEA) is involved.
- Way forward: use of the Special Representatives and WMCC mechanisms for the Eastern Sector; clarity on patrol protocols; speedy infrastructure and surveillance upgrades; and calibrated economic de-risking.
Possible Mains question
**GS2/GS3, 15 marks:** "Despite the 2024 patrolling agreement and the subsequent political détente, face-offs along the LAC persist. Examine the structural reasons for recurring friction and suggest steps for durable border management with China."
Related topics
- Border management: BRO, Vibrant Villages Programme, CAPF mandates
- India–China agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013; Special Representatives mechanism
- India–China trade deficit, FDI Press Note 3 (2020) and its easing
- Geography: Eastern Ladakh friction points; McMahon Line and Arunachal
Topics: GS2Geography
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