BrainParrot

It is for Parliament to enact law against legislators who resign and re-contest ...

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Source: The Hindu, 25 September 2026

Summary

  • Madras High Court (Thursday): A First Division Bench dismissed a PIL by K. Suthan. It declined to direct the Election Commission to recover bypoll costs from legislators who resign and then re-contest on a changed party. It also declined to bar such resignees from contesting for five years. The court said it is for Parliament to enact such a law.
  • ADR / National Election Watch analysis: 111 sitting MPs and MLAs changed parties after being elected, in elections and bypolls from 2022 to 2026.
  • Supreme Court: It declined relief to Danam Nagender, whom the Telangana High Court had disqualified as an MLA under the anti-defection law. It saw no need to interfere with the High Court's order.

UPSC relevance: GS2 — Polity: Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule), ECI powers, electoral reforms, judiciary

Key facts for Prelims

  • Tenth Schedule (inserted by the 52nd Amendment, 1985), read with Articles 102(2) and 191(2).
  • Paragraph 2(1)(a): voluntarily giving up party membership is a disqualification ground.
  • Paragraph 2(1)(b): defying the whip is a ground, with a condonation provision (15 days) and prior permission as safeguards. The SC bench held this condonation provision applies only to defying the whip, not to giving up party membership.
  • Speaker or Chairman decides disqualification, subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).
  • The Election Commission has no free-standing power under Article 324 to add disqualification grounds (Madras HC).
  • Article 14 (equality) was cited as the bar on a six-person-specific scheme.
  • Election Commission 2004 electoral reform proposal: a bypoll expenditure deposit from candidates who contest two constituencies and resign one. It has not become law.
  • Mandamus: a writ commanding performance of a legal duty. The court said it cannot use it to confer a power on the ECI.

Data and details

  • Bench: Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan.
  • The PIL was filed by Chennai advocate K. Suthan. He sought disqualification of legislators who resign without a compelling reason, and a stay on bypolls in Madurantakam and Dharapuram until his main plea was decided.
  • Six individuals won the Assembly elections as AIADMK candidates, resigned and joined the ruling TVK.
  • The EC notified bypolls for only two of the vacant seats, because election petitions were pending for the others.
  • TVK fielded Ms. Kumaravel (Madurantakam) and Ms. Sathyabama (Dharapuram).
  • The EC's 2004 deposit proposal has not been enacted "after two decades". The court had also declined to compel it in another case. So it saw no principled basis for a wider scheme covering single-constituency resignees.
  • Total defectors: 111. This comprises 26 Lok Sabha, 7 Rajya Sabha and 78 Assembly members.
  • State-wise: Nagaland 32 (29%); West Bengal 20 (18%).
  • Parties losing members:
  • NDPP 25 (23%);
  • Trinamool 20 (18%);
  • Congress 19 (17%);
  • BRS 9 (8%);
  • AAP 7 (6%);
  • NCP 7 (6%);
  • Shiv Sena (UBT) 6 (5%);
  • JD(U) 5 (5%);
  • NPP 4 (4%).
  • NDPP, Trinamool and Congress together lost 64 (58%).
  • Parties gaining members:
  • NPF 32 (29%);
  • BJP 29 (26%);
  • NCPI 20 (18%);
  • Congress 9 (8%);
  • Shiv Sena 8 (7%);
  • NPP 6 (5%);
  • People's Party of Arunachal 4 (4%).
  • NPF, BJP and NCPI together gained 81 (73%).
  • The report attributed the recent fall of governments in some State Assemblies to defections.
  • Bench: CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana.
  • Mukul Rohatgi appeared for Danam Nagender.
  • The Telangana High Court had recently disqualified Nagender under the anti-defection law.
  • The Bench found no need to interfere with the High Court order.

Static–dynamic linkage

  • Static concept: Courts do not legislate. The Election Commission's Article 324 powers are plenary for conducting elections, but the Bench held they do not extend to adding new disqualifications beyond those in law. Disqualification grounds come from the Constitution and statute (Arts. 102 and 191, the Tenth Schedule, the RP Act).
  • The loophole: A legislator who resigns the seat vacates it. The Speaker's Tenth Schedule disqualification route is not triggered, and the person can re-contest the bypoll, often on the new party's ticket. This is the same evil the Tenth Schedule targets but with a different mechanism, and the HC's "for Parliament to enact" reasoning leaves the gap for the legislature to fill.
  • Equality angle: A court-ordered scheme aimed at six named individuals would offend Article 14.

Syllabus mapping: GS2 – Polity: Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule, Arts. 102(2)/191(2)); ECI's powers (Art. 324); Representation of the People Act; separation of powers and judicial restraint; electoral reforms

Background primer

Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule)

What it is:
A schedule to the Constitution that disqualifies legislators who defect. It was passed in 1985 through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment and added the Tenth Schedule.
Founded:
It was a response to governments toppled by party-hopping MLAs after the 1967 general elections. The stated object was to curb political defections motivated by the lure of office or similar considerations that endanger democracy's foundations.
Why it matters:
Government stability and party discipline, at the cost of independence for legislators.

Election Commission of India (Article 324)

Additional context

  • The Tenth Schedule fixes no maximum time for the presiding officer to decide. The Supreme Court (2020) held that disqualification petitions must ordinarily be decided within three months of filing.
  • Judicial review of a Speaker's disqualification order is available after the decision is made (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).
  • Reform recommendations: PRS notes the Dinesh Goswami Committee view that disqualification should be limited to voluntarily giving up membership, or to abstaining or defying the whip in confidence or no-confidence motions. Decision-making should rest with the President or Governor on the Election Commission's advice.
  • Comparative: PRS notes that India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Guyana, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe are the only six countries with an anti-defection law that disqualifies legislators who defy the party whip. Most advanced democracies do not disqualify defectors. In Pakistan, disqualification for defying the whip applies only in limited cases such as confidence votes.

Mains dimensions

  • Judicial restraint and separation of powers: The court said the remedy lies with Parliament. It would not use mandamus to give the ECI a power the ECI itself lacks. Disqualification grounds are a legislative domain.
  • Resign-and-recontest loophole: Resignation sidesteps the Tenth Schedule. Six AIADMK winners moved to the ruling TVK. This burdens the public exchequer with bypoll costs and erodes the mandate.
  • Equality and non-arbitrariness: A relief confined to six named persons based on the timing of their resignations would violate Article 14. Reform must be general and prospective.
  • Scale of defection: 111 switches in four years. Nagaland alone accounts for 29%. The numbers suggest the anti-defection law's deterrence is limited. Gains were concentrated, with NPF, BJP and NCPI together taking 73% of the switchers. The report attributed the recent fall of governments in some State Assemblies to defections.
  • Role of presiding officers: The Tenth Schedule's silence on timelines and the Speaker's partisan position have drawn repeated criticism. Courts have intervened (e.g. the SC 2020 three-month rule). The Telangana case shows the judiciary stepping in.
  • Way forward:
  • legislate a bypoll cost-recovery deposit (the EC's 2004 proposal);
  • define "voluntarily giving up membership" clearly;
  • move disqualification decisions to an independent authority (President or Governor on EC advice, or a tribunal);
  • impose a cooling-off period for resignees.

Possible Mains question

**GS2, 15 marks:** "The anti-defection law has not stopped legislators from changing sides, and resignation followed by re-contest has emerged as a workaround. Critically evaluate the law's effectiveness and suggest reforms."

Related topics

  • Articles 101(3)(b) and 190(3)(b) (resignation of seat) and Articles 102 and 191 (disqualifications)
  • Representation of the People Act, 1951: bypoll timelines and disqualification provisions
  • Article 324: ECI powers; Article 14: equality
  • Kihoto Hollohan (1992); the Speaker's role and the Rajendra Singh Rana line of cases
  • Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990), Law Commission (170th report, 1999; 255th report, 2015) on electoral reform and the anti-defection law
  • Related: judicial review vs. legislative domain (PIL limits)

Topics: GS2Polity

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