How does India address service outages?
Source: The Hindu, 17 November 2026
Summary
- From November 12 to 13, an unspecified fault in Microsoft's infrastructure cut users worldwide off from Microsoft 365, including the Outlook email service. The editorial says tens of millions of people were affected.
- Microsoft apologised and blamed a fault in an upgrade of its network capacity. More precise details are still awaited.
- In India, IndiGo and Akasa Air warned passengers that their email support was disrupted, and Air India rerouted its email.
- The explainer asks whether Indian law forces such a provider to report or account for an outage. Its answer is that each of three regimes has a gap. The editorial argues the real problem is centralisation of digital systems.
Key facts for Prelims
- CERT-In is the national agency for cyber incident response under Section 70B of the IT Act, 2000. It sits under MeitY and was established in 2004.
- CERT-In's directions of 28 April 2022 were issued under Section 70B(6). They require reporting of specified cyber incidents within six hours. The article says they cover attacks and intrusions, not outages from technical faults.
- Section 70B(6) lets CERT-In call for information. The article says this could be used to seek an explanation from Microsoft.
- Related IT Act provisions: Section 70 allows a "Protected System" to be declared, and Section 70A mandates a nodal agency for critical networks.
- The DPDP Act, 2023 defines a "personal data breach" to include accidental "loss of access to personal data". This is the hook for treating outages as breaches.
- The Data Protection Board of India is a digital-first body, established under Section 18 of the DPDP Act, with a Chairperson and four other Members. Appeals lie with TDSAT.
- Non-notification of a breach to the Board or affected persons can attract a penalty of up to ₹200 crore.
- RBI directions on managing risks in outsourcing (28 November 2025) build on the IT outsourcing rules effective 1 October 2023. They require a bank to assess its dependence on the supplier and to have an exit strategy.
- The EU's NIS2 is a cross-sector law covering cloud companies. The EU's DORA covers critical tech vendors to financial firms. South Korea's disaster-plan rule followed the KakaoTalk outage.
Data and details
- Outage dates: 12–13 November (2026). Airlines affected in India: IndiGo, Akasa Air and Air India.
- CERT-In directions date: 28 April 2022. Reporting window: six hours.
- RBI outsourcing directions: 28 November 2025. Earlier rules took effect 1 October 2023.
- DPDP breach-reporting Rules to take effect in May 2027. Penalty: up to ₹200 crore.
- EU DORA: 19 critical ICT vendors named on 18 November 2025, including Microsoft and Tata Consultancy Services. An Indian company already reports to European supervisors.
- UK: As of 13 July 2026, Microsoft and three other companies were placed under the Bank of England. Both the EU and UK schemes cover only services sold to financial firms.
- EU NIS2 (October 2024 rules): a cloud service has a "significant incident" if completely unavailable for more than 30 minutes. A partial failure counts if it lasts more than an hour and affects over 5% or over 1 million of the service's EU users, whichever is smaller. The provider must inform the national authority within 24 hours and file a detailed notification within 72 hours. The Microsoft outage would have counted, because the threshold is duration.
- Europe's data-protection regulators treat even a temporary loss of access as a breach to be logged. They demand a report only if people are put at risk.
- Singapore passed a digital infrastructure law on 7 October. It requires a licence for large data centres and cloud firms, and requires them to report service interruptions to the regulator.
- South Korea: a fire at a data centre in October 2022 knocked out the KakaoTalk messaging app. Since July 2023, large platforms and data centres must submit disaster management plans to the government.
- Common thread abroad: the reporting duty depends on outage duration and the number of people affected. In India, CERT-In's duty depends on whether an attack occurred.
- India has no minimum harm threshold for reporting a breach. It is unclear whether a temporary outage is a "loss of access".
- Customer recourse is contractual. If the service level is missed, the customer may get a credit, meaning a discount on a future bill.
- In December 2025, the Union government told the Lok Sabha that 12.68 lakh official email accounts had moved to a platform run by Chennai-based Zoho. An Indian supplier's outage would still carry no duty to report to CERT-In.
- Editorial claims: the internet was designed as a "network of networks". Cost pressures led to shared infrastructure, and only a few providers remain at Microsoft's scale. The editorial says "there is no such thing as a reliable vendor".
- The explainer's author, N.V. Geetha, is a former Senior Technical Director at the National Informatics Centre.
Static–dynamic linkage
India regulates digital failures through separate, sector-specific instruments:
- the IT Act, 2000, which creates CERT-In;
- the RBI's outsourcing rules for banks;
- the DPDP Act, 2023 for personal data.
None of them targets a service-availability failure, meaning an outage that is neither an attack nor a data theft. This is the static question behind the news: who must report, to whom, and on what trigger. The trigger could be an attack, a loss of access to data, or downtime and the number of users affected. A related concept is concentration risk, where many users depend on a few shared cloud providers. A fault at one provider then cascades through the economy.
Syllabus mapping: GS3 – Science & Technology / Internal Security: Cyber security, IT infrastructure, role of CERT-In; GS2 – Governance: Statutory/regulatory bodies, accountability of service providers, data protection; Prelims – S&T (IT & cyber) and Polity.
Background primer
CERT-In (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team)
- What it is:
- India's national agency for cyber incident response, with its legal mandate in Section 70B of the IT Act, 2000. It collects, analyses and disseminates information on cyber incidents, issues security guidelines and coordinates response.
- Founded:
- Established in 2004 as a functional organisation of the Ministry of Electronics and IT; the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 designated it as the national agency.
- Members:
- A technical agency within MeitY.
- Mandate:
- Under Section 70B(6) it can call for information and give directions to service providers, intermediaries, data centres and bodies corporate. Its 28 April 2022 directions were issued under this sub-section.
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 and Data Protection Board of India
- What it is:
- India's first dedicated digital-privacy law. The DPDP Rules, 2025 fully operationalise the Act.
- Founded:
- The Rules were notified on 14 November 2025. They provide an eighteen-month phased compliance period. The article states the breach-reporting provisions take effect in May 2027.
- Members:
- The Data Protection Board of India is established under Section 18 of the Act. It consists of a Chairperson and four other Members (per MeitY's recruitment notice). It is a digital-first body. Appeals against its decisions go to TDSAT.
- Mandate:
- The Board oversees compliance, inquires into breaches and ensures corrective measures. Failure to notify the Board or affected individuals of a breach can attract a penalty of up to ₹200 crore.
- Why it matters:
- The obligation falls on the "data fiduciary", which is the organisation that collected the data. That is Microsoft's customer, not Microsoft.
RBI rules on outsourcing of IT services (banks)
- What it is:
- RBI directions that make a regulated bank responsible for risks from outsourced IT, including cloud services.
- Founded:
- The Outsourcing of IT Services Directions, 2023 came into effect on 1 October 2023. The article says the Directions of 28 November 2025 carry these rules forward. These are titled the RBI (Commercial Banks – Managing Risks in Outsourcing) Directions, 2025.
- Mandate:
- The principle is that outsourcing must not weaken the bank's ability to meet its obligations to customers or impede RBI supervision. A bank buying cloud services must assess its dependence on the supplier and have an exit strategy.
- Why it matters:
- Banks depend heavily on third-party IT, which exposes them to concentration and vendor risk.
Cloud concentration risk (concept)
Additional context
- The 2022 CERT-In directions also require service providers to keep ICT system logs for a rolling 180 days within Indian jurisdiction, and require cloud and VPN providers to register validated subscriber details. Cloud providers are therefore already inside CERT-In's regulatory net for records, though not for outage reporting.
- Under the Schedule to the DPDP Act, the highest penalty is up to ₹250 crore, for failing to take reasonable security safeguards. The ₹200 crore penalty in the article is for failing to notify a breach.
Mains dimensions
- Three regimes, three gaps:
- CERT-In's six-hour rule is attack-triggered and does not cover technical-fault outages.
- The RBI rules hold banks, not the vendor, responsible.
- The DPDP Act puts the reporting burden on the customer (data fiduciary), not Microsoft, which holds the data. It is also ambiguous on whether an outage is a "loss of access" breach.
- Comparative regulation:
- The EU and UK put critical vendors directly under financial supervisors, but only for financial services.
- NIS2 triggers on duration (30 minutes, or an hour for partial failures) and on user numbers.
- Singapore licenses large data centres and cloud firms and mandates interruption reporting.
- South Korea mandates disaster plans after the KakaoTalk fire.
- India is the outlier in keying reporting to an attack.
- Four reform paths (explainer):
- Widen CERT-In's reportable incidents to include major disruptions whatever the cause.
- Place the largest digital service providers under a direct regulator.
- Have the Data Protection Board clarify, before May 2027, whether outages are breaches and who reports.
- Shift official services to Indian vendors.
- Limits of "swadeshi" substitution:
- The Zoho migration of 12.68 lakh government email accounts reduces foreign dependence.
- An Indian vendor's technical fault would still go unreported.
- The editorial agrees that cyber sovereignty cannot mean merely swapping a global vendor for a domestic one.
- Structural critique (editorial):
- Centralisation subverts the internet's decentralised architecture. Mistakes now cascade through the economy.
- Policy should invest in resilience and shield critical operations from disruption, however improbable.
- New AI data centres will make centralised systems even bigger, so mitigating rare failures matters more.
- Governance/accountability angle: Customers' only remedy is a service credit under the contract. Citizens in sectors like aviation and banking bear the costs without direct recourse.
Possible Mains question
**GS3 (S&T/Cyber), 15 marks:** "A recent global outage of a major cloud-based productivity suite has exposed regulatory gaps in India. Examine the adequacy of India's present framework (IT Act/CERT-In, RBI outsourcing norms and the DPDP Act) for accountability of large digital service providers, and suggest a way forward."
Related topics
- IT Act, 2000: Sections 70, 70A, 70B; NCIIPC and critical information infrastructure
- DPDP Act, 2023: data fiduciary, data principal, Significant Data Fiduciary; Right to Privacy (Puttaswamy case)
- RBI regulation of IT outsourcing and cybersecurity framework for banks; operational resilience
- Cyber sovereignty, data localisation, and India's digital public infrastructure
- Data centre and cloud policy; AI data centres and energy/infrastructure implications
Topics: GS3Sci & Tech
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