To strengthen the Supreme Court, divide it
Source: The Hindu, 14 November 2026
Summary
- The op-ed argues that the Supreme Court has been swamped by ordinary appeals, so its constitutional work has withered.
- It proposes a lean Constitutional Court of about 11 judges in Delhi, hearing only constitutional cases and substantial questions of law. Four or five regional Courts of Appeal would take over ordinary appeals.
- It says adding judges cannot fix this. The answer is to sort the work, and the court should be given a filter on which cases it hears.
Key facts for Prelims
- Article 130: the Supreme Court sits in Delhi or such other place(s) as the CJI appoints with the President's approval.
- Article 136: Special Leave Petitions are discretionary appeals, intended as a rare safety valve (per the article).
- Article 124(1) with the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956: Parliament fixes the Court's strength by ordinary law.
- Constitution Bench: matters needing interpretation of the Constitution require a Bench of at least five judges (Article 145(3)).
- Law Commission of India, 229th Report (2009): a Constitution Bench in Delhi plus four regional Cassation Benches.
- Bihar Legal Support Society (1986): a Constitution Bench under CJI P.N. Bhagwati said the Court was never meant to be an ordinary court of appeal.
- Basic structure doctrine: the article cites it as the Court's signature constitutional contribution.
- Comparative models named in the article:
- US Supreme Court over 13 federal Courts of Appeals.
- South Africa: Constitutional Court (Johannesburg) and Supreme Court of Appeal (Bloemfontein).
- Germany: Federal Constitutional Court (Karlsruhe).
- Brazil: Supreme Federal Tribunal, with the Superior Tribunal of Justice created by the 1988 Constitution.
- Filter concepts: the US certiorari discretion (held since 1925) and Brazil's "general repercussion" test (2004 reform).
Data and details
- 2016: three Supreme Court judges framed 11 questions on whether the apex court had lost its way. The reference to a larger Bench is still unheard a decade later.
- Pendency: 92,318 cases at the end of 2025, the heaviest backlog ever and nearly 10,000 more than a year earlier.
- Constitution Bench output: an average of 134 cases a year in the first half of the 1960s, against fewer than 10 a year over the last decade.
- SLPs: by one count, 84.6% of the admission docket in 2011.
- Proposed design: about 11 judges in Delhi (Constitutional Court) and four or five regional Courts of Appeal.
- 229th Report (2009): a Constitution Bench in Delhi plus four regional Cassation Benches.
- 2023: a Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended regional Benches, and the Union Law Ministry has since accepted the idea.
- US certiorari: roughly 1% of about 7,000 petitions a year are granted review.
- Brazil: the split alone did not ease the backlog. It fell only after the apex court got the power to filter out cases.
- Bench strength and pendency:
- When the Bench was expanded to 34 in 2019, pendency was near 60,000. It is now close to 93,000.
- In 2025 the Court disposed of 65,615 cases but 75,410 fresh matters arrived.
- In 2026 Parliament raised sanctioned strength to 38.
- The Court "already sits in a dozen small Benches" that often contradict each other, and holds only a handful of Constitution Benches a year.
Static–dynamic linkage
- The Supreme Court is the guardian of the Constitution. Its jurisdictions include original, appellate (including discretionary Special Leave Petitions under Article 136), advisory and writ.
- When SLPs dominate the docket, the court becomes a general appellate court. It then has less bench time for constitutional questions that need large Benches.
- Article 130 fixes Delhi as the seat of the Court, subject to sittings elsewhere. This is the legal hook for regional Benches.
- Two design choices are in play:
- Structural: a two-tier court.
- Procedural: a certiorari-style filter, meaning discretion over which cases to hear.
Syllabus mapping: GS2 — Polity: Structure, organisation & functioning of the Judiciary; judicial reforms and pendency. Related: Supreme Court jurisdictions (original, appellate, advisory, writ) and Article 136.
Background primer
Supreme Court of India
- What it is:
- The apex court under Part V of the Constitution. It is the final interpreter of the Constitution and the highest appellate court.
- Founded:
- Established with the Constitution in 1950. Its sanctioned strength is set by Parliament, not fixed in the Constitution.
- Members:
- Article 124(1) originally provided for a CJI and up to seven other judges. Parliament can increase the number by law, so no constitutional amendment is needed. Changes go through the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, and a simple majority suffices.
- Mandate:
- Enforcing Fundamental Rights (Article 32), hearing appeals (including SLPs under Article 136), advising the President (Article 143), and deciding Union-State disputes.
- Why it matters:
- A single final court that declares binding law and protects constitutional supremacy.
Cassation Benches / Constitution Bench (the proposed architecture)
- What it is:
- A Constitution Bench in Delhi for constitutional matters. Regional "Cassation" Benches would handle appeals from High Courts. Cassation courts only interpret the relevant law and are appellate courts of the highest instance.
- Founded:
- Proposed by the Law Commission in its 229th Report (August 2009). The report was titled "Need for division of the Supreme Court into a Constitution Bench at Delhi and Cassation Benches in four regions".
- Mandate:
- Cassation Benches would handle all appellate work arising from the High Courts of their region.
- Why it matters:
- To free the apex court for constitutional questions and bring appellate justice closer to litigants.
Additional context
-
Article 130 route. The 229th Report reasoned that a liberal reading of Article 130 could allow regional Cassation Benches and a Constitution Bench at Delhi without a constitutional amendment, with action by the CJI and Presidential approval enough. It noted the CJI acts as persona designata and need not consult anyone, so only Presidential approval is needed.
-
Parliamentary Standing Committee. Its 133rd Report said the Supreme Court may invoke Article 130 to set up regional benches at four or five locations. Constitutional matters would be dealt with in Delhi, while regional benches would decide appellate matters, and their decisions would be treated as final.
-
Challenges flagged in the same debate. Regional benches may lead to conflicting interpretations of law, which would undermine uniformity.
-
2026 expansion of the Bench.
- The Union Cabinet approved on 5 May 2026 a rise in strength from 33 to 37 excluding the CJI, taking the total from 34 to 38 with the CJI.
- The previous revision, in 2019, raised the number from 30 to 33 excluding the CJI.
- The Bill was passed as a Money Bill, and the Speaker's power to certify Money Bills is pending before a seven-judge Constitution Bench.
- One explainer criticised the Bill for overlooking the 229th Report's view that adding judges alone would not resolve pendency or access to justice.
Mains dimensions
- Diagnosis, mission drift. Constitution Benches decided 134 cases a year in the early 1960s and fewer than 10 now. Article 136 SLPs, meant as a rare safety valve, took 84.6% of the 2011 admission docket. The Court admitted in Bihar Legal Support Society (1986) that it was never meant to be an ordinary appeals court.
- Capacity argument fails. Disposals of 65,615 against 75,410 fresh filings in 2025 show the Court falling behind even at full effort. Pendency rose from about 60,000 (2019, Bench of 34) to about 93,000, even with strength now raised to 38. Adding judges "without sorting the work" enlarges the same court.
- Specialisation and consistency. A dedicated Constitutional Court sitting in full Benches could give predictable, settled rulings. Regional appellate courts would clear ordinary cases faster and bring final appeals closer to citizens (access to justice).
- Comparative evidence.
- The US, South Africa and Germany run tiered systems.
- Brazil is the closest recent parallel and also a warning: the 1988 split did not by itself cut backlog. It fell only after the filtering power (the 2004 "general repercussion" test).
- The US has used discretionary review since 1925.
- Without a filter, a Constitutional Court would "inherit, in miniature" the same congestion.
- Legal feasibility and federal-judicial design. The 229th Report's reading of Article 130 means the Court itself, with the President's approval, could start without a constitutional amendment. The 2023 Standing Committee recommendation was accepted by the Law Ministry, so the executive is not the obstacle.
- Counter-argument (strongest objection). Successive CJIs fear a divided court is no longer a single supreme one. Regional courts may be seen as lesser venues, litigants may press to reach Delhi, and the authority of one final court may be diffused. The authors reply that indivisibility is already a "fiction" because the Court sits in multiple conflicting panels, and that separation would rescue the constitutional core.
- Way forward. Create the two tiers, adopt a "general repercussion"-type filter, and sequence the steps (Article 130 first, constitutional amendment if needed).
Possible Mains question
**GS Paper 2, 15 marks:** "The Supreme Court has drifted from being a constitutional court to a general court of appeal. Critically examine the case for splitting it into a Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal, and discuss the safeguards needed to preserve its unity and authority."
Related topics
- Article 32 vs Article 226; Article 143 (advisory jurisdiction); Article 141 (law declared is binding)
- Judicial pendency (NJDG), tribunals and alternative dispute resolution; the proposed National Court of Appeal idea
- Collegium system and judicial appointments; Money Bill certification by the Speaker (Article 110)
- Access to justice and legal aid (Article 39A)
Topics: GS2Polity
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