Winning, differently
Published: · Updated:
Source: The Hindu, 13 October 2026
Summary
- By-elections in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry (five seats), declared on Friday, were all won by the ruling party. The editorial argues the margin of victory differed sharply between the states because of their different political cultures.
- In Tamil Nadu, AIADMK MLAs resigned, defected to the ruling TVK and were renominated by it. This, says the editorial, defeats the spirit of the anti-defection law and the Assembly mandate, and it is worrying that voters rewarded it.
Key facts for Prelims
- Tenth Schedule inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985; the 91st Amendment, 2003 removed the one-third "split" and kept the two-thirds "merger" exception.
- The presiding officer decides disqualification, with no specified time limit in the law.
- A nominated member is disqualified if they join a party after six months.
- Presiding officer's decision is subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan case).
- Supreme Court has said Speakers should decide within three months (Keisham Meghachandra Singh, 2020).
- By-elections: Section 151A, RP Act 1951 (static).
- Article 190(3): Speaker's check on genuineness of resignation.
Data and details
- Results were declared Friday, about five months after the April Assembly elections. The ruling party in each state/UT won all five bypolls.
- West Bengal: BJP retained Nandigram and wrested Rejinagar with 76% and 63% of the vote (in that order of mention). Puducherry: All India N.R. Congress won Thattanchavady with 61%.
- Nandigram and Thattanchavady were vacated by the Chief Ministers, partly explaining the large margins.
- Tamil Nadu: Dharapuram and Madurantakam fell vacant after AIADMK MLAs resigned and defected to the ruling TVK. TVK renominated them and they won with 37% and 40% respectively, leading DMK rivals by about eight percentage points.
- TVK's tally in the 234-member House rose to 109. CM C. Joseph Vijay ran a no-holds-barred campaign yet the margins were narrow, so the expected "honeymoon effect" did not fully materialise.
- DMK is now TVK's principal rival and retains a solid base despite its abrupt defeat in May. AIADMK finished third in seats it won in May. Four more AIADMK MLAs have joined the TVK and their seats will also go to bypolls.
- In West Bengal the winner-take-all pattern has run through the Left Front's long rule, 15 years of Trinamool Congress, and the BJP's tenure so far. Opposition parties do much worse in panchayat and by-elections than in Assembly/Lok Sabha polls.
Static–dynamic linkage
- A bypoll fills a vacancy caused by resignation, death or disqualification. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Section 151A) generally requires it within six months of the vacancy. Bypolls favour the ruling party because voters want a representative with access to government.
- The Tenth Schedule disqualifies legislators who voluntarily give up party membership. A legislator who resigns his seat is not "disqualified" and can be renominated, which gives the "resign, defect, recontest" route that the editorial criticises.
- The editorial links two issues: weakening of opposition competition in bypolls (West Bengal) and an erosion of the anti-defection law's spirit (Tamil Nadu).
Syllabus mapping: GS2 – Polity: Representation of People Act; Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule); Electoral reforms; Role of political parties
Background primer
Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule)
- What it is:
- It sets the provisions for disqualification of elected members on grounds of defection to another political party.
- Founded:
- Included in the Constitution by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985. It was a response to the toppling of several state governments by party-hopping MLAs after the 1967 general elections.
- Mandate:
- Grounds are voluntarily giving up party membership, violating the party whip, an independent member joining a party, or a nominated member joining a party after six months.
- Why it matters:
- To give governments stability by discouraging legislators from changing parties. Since the 91st Amendment (2003), at least two-thirds of a party's members must favour a merger for it to be valid.
Additional context
- In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly (13 Nov 2019, the Karnataka MLAs case), the Supreme Court upheld the disqualification of 17 legislators. It struck down the Speaker's bar on contesting till the end of the Assembly term and held that disqualification does not bar contesting by-elections, since neither the Constitution nor the statutes say so. This is directly relevant to the debate on defect-and-recontest.
- The Court also observed that a resignation does not erase the effect of a prior act amounting to disqualification, and that a pending disqualification action does not lapse on submission of a resignation.
- Under Article 190(3) the Speaker must ascertain that a resignation is voluntary and genuine before accepting it.
- In Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court ruled that Speakers must decide disqualification pleas within three months except in extraordinary circumstances. In Ravi S. Naik (1994) it clarified that formal resignation from the party is not required to attract disqualification.
- The 2nd ARC recommended that disqualification be decided by the President/Governor on the Election Commission's advice.
Mains dimensions
- Incumbency advantage in bypolls: Voters prefer representatives with access to government. Vacating CMs' seats (Nandigram, Thattanchavady) explain part of the large margins.
- Different political cultures: West Bengal shows a winner-take-all mandate extended to local and by-elections. Tamil Nadu shows a competitive three-way contest (TVK, DMK, AIADMK).
- Resign-defect-renominate loophole: MLAs resign months, sometimes days, into their terms and are re-fielded by the ruling party. The editorial says this overrides the Assembly mandate and defeats the spirit of the anti-defection law. The Tenth Schedule bites on voluntary give-up of membership, but resignation lets members avoid it.
- Cost and quality of representation: Repeated bypolls impose costs and let ruling parties poach opposition legislators. The editorial worries that the electorate rewarded the manoeuvre.
- Decline of an opposition party: AIADMK's third place in the seats it held and the exit of four more MLAs raise questions about its ability to retain legislators.
- Reform options: Time-bound adjudication by presiding officers; an independent adjudicator (2nd ARC proposal via President/Governor on EC advice); a bar on defectors holding ministerial office until re-elected. The 91st Amendment already imposes this on members disqualified under the Tenth Schedule, but a member who simply resigns is not disqualified, so the bar does not reach the resign-and-recontest route. The Law Commission's suggestion that a defector must resign and stay out of ministerial posts until winning a by-election addresses this gap (suggestion, not in the article).
Possible Mains question
**GS2, 15 marks:** "The anti-defection law has been circumvented through resignations followed by re-election on the defected party's ticket. Examine the effectiveness of the Tenth Schedule in preserving the electoral mandate and suggest reforms."
Related topics
- Tenth Schedule; Kihoto Hollohan; Speaker's role and neutrality
- Representation of the People Act, 1951: bypoll timelines (Section 151A)
- 91st Amendment, 2003; limits on size of the Council of Ministers
- Electoral reforms; role of political parties; anti-incumbency and bypoll trends
Topics: GS2Polity
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