BrainParrot

Form 7 objections in Karnataka SIR mostly against Muslim voters

GS2Full notePublished: · Updated:

Source: The Hindu, 30 September 2026

Summary

  • In Karnataka's ongoing special intensive revision (SIR), bulk Form 7 applications seek deletion of voters, largely Muslim. The Form-10 statutory report shows more than 4,000 deletions sought across several Assembly constituencies.
  • Some physical forms had the voters' details already printed, with only the objector's name handwritten. A named objector denied being the person on the forms. Some forms are missing from the digitised Form-10 list.
  • Congress and civil society groups want the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) to order criminal action. Only authorised election officials can file such complaints.
  • In Delhi's SIR, booth-level agents (BLAs) bypassed the Election Commission's cap of 10 applications a day by filing through the ECINET portal, which has no such limit. Cases of self-deletion and wrong "shifted" claims also surfaced.

UPSC relevance: GS2 — Polity: Elections, ECI, electoral roll integrity, Representation of the People Acts

Key facts for Prelims

  • Form 7 is prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (rules 13(2) and 26), framed under the RP Act, 1950.
  • Form 6 is for new inclusion and Form 8 for modification or correction. Form 10 is the consolidated public list/report of Form 7 objections.
  • The ERO decides claims and objections, after notice, hearing and a speaking order.
  • The BLO is the polling-station level official. A BLA is the party-appointed agent for a recognised party.
  • ECINET is the Election Commission's digital portal.
  • Under law, only authorised election officials can file criminal complaints on electoral roll offences. A private person cannot, and a State government cannot act suo motu.
  • Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence, direction and control of elections. Article 326 provides adult suffrage.

Data and details

  • More than 4,000 deletions sought, per the Form-10 statutory report. Reason cited in the applications: "Absent/Permanently Shifted".
  • Before September 22, Form 7 applications on the shifted ground were usually two or three per polling station. Most were self-deletions. Bulk filing began on September 22, a day before the claims and objections deadline.
  • Babaleshwar (represented by Congress Minister M.B. Patil): 1,373 applications on September 22, of which 1,363 came from just 10 people, largely against Muslim voters outside the objectors' own polling stations.
  • Huchappa Ganiger filed 493 applications across 30 polling stations in two days: 423 on September 22 and 70 on September 23.
  • Govindaraj Mundur filed 413 across 33 polling stations.
  • Bhalki (Bidar district, Minister Eshwar Khandre): at least 30 people sought deletion of more than 1,700 names on September 23. An elector named Santosh filed 120 on September 23 after 54 on September 22.
  • Basavakalyan (BJP-represented): Siddappa filed 32 of the 37 applications received in one day, all against Muslim voters in one polling station (Part No. 163).
  • Belthangady (Dakshina Kannada, BJP-represented): Umesh Bangera filed 21 applications, all against Muslim voters in Part No. 47.
  • Form irregularities: In some Bhalki forms the objector details were handwritten while the targeted voters' details were already printed. Applications named "Vishnuvardhan Kote" (Booth 129), but the person said he was "Suresh". The EPIC details were linked to an elector called Vishnuvardhan. Another objector name, "Santosh Eshwar", appeared on more than 170 applications.
  • Digitisation gap: Vishnuvardhan's name was absent from the Form-10 list, while Santosh's name was listed. Bidar officials said many offline applications may not yet be digitised.
  • Official response: Bidar and Vijayapura officials said objections would be scrutinised before any action. Bulk filers were told that claims without valid grounds could invite punishment.
  • Aland precedent: Unidentified individuals filed Form 7s seeking deletion of 5,994 voters. After a complaint by Congress candidate B.R. Patil, the CEO ordered a probe, and the then Returning Officer, Aland filed a police complaint, leading to an FIR.
  • Demands: The KPCC president B.K. Hariprasad wrote to the CEO seeking suo motu action. Noor Sridhar of SIR Virodhi Okkuta sought an inquiry and a criminal case against those behind fraudulent Form 7s.
  • EC guidelines: BLAs of recognised parties may file in bulk, but a BLA "shall not submit more than" 10 forms a day after draft roll publication. Forms 6, 7 and 8 are to be computerised and uploaded daily on the Delhi CEO's website.
  • ECINET has no mechanism to impose the cap. Analysis of Form 10 reports from September 21 to 27 showed four individuals filing more than 10 a day:
  • BJP BLA Chitresh Chandoliya: 35 in two days (12 on September 21 and 23 on September 22). He is the son of BJP's North West Delhi MP Yogender Chandoliya.
  • Raj Singh: 13 on September 26 (Patel Nagar, Part 38).
  • Arun Kumar Tanwar: 12 on September 25 (Delhi Cantonment).
  • Sabo Devi: 15 on September 27 (Tri Nagar).
  • Mr. Chitresh's defence: he filed online with Aadhaar authentication, where there is no BLA-specific limit. All his Karol Bagh Form 7s cited "absent/permanently shifted", and he said 15 women had married and moved out. The Hindu found Karnail Singh at his listed address; Mr. Chitresh said the voter "lives far from his booth". Brothers Danish Khan and Toufiq Khan, also challenged, said they filed nothing.
  • Self-objection oddity: 20-year-old Apoorv Dwivedy (Sangam Vihar) appeared to have filed Form 7 against his own name citing "death".
  • Between September 21 and 27 there were 1,095 Form 7 objections in Delhi. Around 80% were by individuals against their own names. An ERO said that in offline filing an objector can enter another person's name in the objector field.
  • Form 10 reports stay on ECINET for seven days. Application-level details were not published on the CEO's website nearly a month into the claims and objections period. The Delhi CEO's office did not respond.
  • Disposal anomaly: from September 14 to 20, 519 Form 7 were disposed of against 92 Form 6, though Form 6 applications were higher in number. Disposing of an objection requires notice, hearing and a speaking order.
  • Timeline: the claims and objections deadline was extended from September 30 to October 30. The final roll is due on December 4. Since the draft roll, the EC has received 1.54 lakh inclusion applications and 3,435 deletion applications.

Static–dynamic linkage

The right to vote rests on Article 326 (adult suffrage) and the electoral roll, which is prepared under the RP Act, 1950. A name can be removed only through a quasi-judicial process: an objection, a notice, a hearing and a reasoned (speaking) order by the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO). Form 7 is the door for deletions. When it is used in bulk without verification, a statutory safeguard becomes a tool for disenfranchisement. That is why the process safeguards (notice, hearing, objector's onus, penal consequences) matter as much as the deletions.

Syllabus mapping: GS2 – Polity: Representation of the People Act, 1950 (electoral rolls); Election Commission (Article 324); free and fair elections; GS2 – Governance: transparency and accountability in administrative processes.

Background primer

Form 7 (objection to inclusion / request for deletion)

What it is:
"Application for objecting inclusion or seeking deletion of name in electoral roll", prescribed under rules 13(2) and 26. It covers grounds such as death, duplication, shifting of residence, ineligibility by age or citizenship, or misrepresentation. It is prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, framed under the RP Act, 1950. It can be used against another voter or for self-deletion.

Electoral roll machinery

Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

Additional context

  • SIR Phase-II was launched after the Bihar SIR and covered nearly 51 crore electors across 9 States and 3 UTs (PIB).
  • In Bihar's SIR, the Supreme Court judgment records that the draft roll of 1 August 2025 had about 7.24 crore electors, against about 7.89 crore on 24 June 2025, so nearly 65 lakh were excluded. The final roll of 30 September 2025 had 7.42 crore electors.

Mains dimensions

  • Misuse of a legal safeguard: Bulk filing in a narrow window (September 22–23 in Karnataka, ahead of the deadline) with identical "Absent/Permanently Shifted" grounds suggests coordination rather than organic objection. In Babaleshwar, 10 people filed 1,363 of 1,373 applications.
  • Communal targeting concern: The targets were largely Muslim voters, often outside the objector's own polling station and sometimes within one polling station (Part 163; Part 47). The affected seats include Congress-held (Babaleshwar, Bhalki) and BJP-held (Basavakalyan, Belthangady) constituencies, so the pattern is not tied to one party's seats.
  • Document integrity: Pre-printed targets with handwritten objector details, an objector who disowned his identity, and EPIC mismatches all raise forgery and impersonation questions. The digitisation gap (a physical form without a Form-10 entry) weakens public auditability.
  • Technology gap in rule enforcement: The 10-forms-a-day cap exists in guidelines but is not coded into ECINET. Online filing needs no BLA identification. An 80% share of self-objections and an apparent self-"death" case point to weak validation.
  • Transparency deficit: Application-level details were not uploaded as the guidelines require. Form 10 is available for only seven days.
  • Quasi-judicial discipline: The higher disposal of Form 7 than Form 6 despite fewer Form 7 filings raises concerns about due process (notice, hearing, speaking order) and ERO workload.
  • Enforcement vacuum: Only authorised election officials can lodge criminal complaints, so parties, civil society and State governments cannot move directly. The Aland FIR (probe by CEO, then RO's complaint) shows the route exists but depends on the Election Commission machinery.
  • Institutional credibility: SIR's legitimacy depends on the ECI protecting eligible voters. Deadline extension in Delhi (to October 30) gives time for verification.
  • Way forward: Auto-flag multiple filings by one ID, enforce the cap in software, mandatory field verification and hearing before any deletion, publish application-level data daily, and use penal action under Section 31 of the RP Act, 1950 against false declarations.

Possible Mains question

**GS2, 15 marks:** "Recent episodes of bulk Form 7 objections during the Special Intensive Revision have raised concerns about the integrity of electoral roll revision. Examine the safeguards in the law and suggest reforms to ensure that no eligible voter is deleted."

Related topics

  • Article 324, Article 326, and Sections 21 and 31 of the RP Act, 1950 (electoral rolls) vs. the RP Act, 1951 (conduct of elections)
  • Roles of ERO, AERO, BLO, BLA, CEO and DEO
  • Summary vs. intensive vs. special revision of rolls
  • Electoral roll–Aadhaar linkage and ECINET/digital governance
  • SIR in Bihar and Phase-II: the Supreme Court's directions on Aadhaar and documents

Topics: GS2Polity

How we write and check these notes →

All current affairs of 30 September 2026 → · UPSC Current Affairs